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“His purse just fell out of his mouth.” – Gay Colloquialism 
I. INTRODUCTION 
While race, religion, ethnicity, and sex will always remain salient 
social issues in our nation, sexual orientation is currently at the forefront 
of our national debate and will likely not abate in the foreseeable future.1 
This necessarily implicates longstanding sex and gender debates.2 Courts 
must adapt to new understandings of discrimination when ruling within 
the confines of Congress’s civil rights legislation. Federal courts, for ex-
ample, struggle in differentiating sex, gender, and sexuality when adjudi-
cating Title VII3 employment discrimination claims.4 Because Title VII 
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 1. For example, the New York Times reports that the issue of gay marriage “has been a flash-
point in American politics for more than a decade, setting off waves of competing legislation, law-
suits and ballot initiatives to either legalize or ban the practice and causing rifts within religious 
groups.” Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2012), 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/s/same_sex_marriage/index.html. 
 2. A prominent scholar in gender studies, R. W. Connell, describes the ubiquity and timeless-
ness of gender debates:   
Because gender is a way of structuring social practice in general, not a special type of 
practice, it is unavoidably involved with other social structure. It is now common to say 
that gender “intersects”—better, interacts—with race and class. We might add that it con-
stantly interacts with nationality or position in the world order. 
R. W. CONNELL, MASCULINITIES 75 (1995). 
 3. Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); Katherine M. Franke, The Central 
Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 15 
(1995) (noting that judges must write on a “blank slate” when adjudicating a sex discrimination 
case); Zachary A. Kramer, Heterosexuality and Title VII, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 205, 239 (2009) (ex-
plaining that most scholars and courts believe the sex amendment came at the last minute in an at-
tempt to derail Title VII completely; therefore, its addition had no legislative history to explain the 
meaning of sex). 
 4. Michael S. Kimmel demonstrates the difficulty in delineating this boundary in the appropri-
ate context of homophobia: “Homophobia is the fear that other men will unmask us, emasculate us, 
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does not protect employees from sexual orientation-based discrimina-
tion,5 plaintiffs who are or are perceived to be of a sexual minority have 
difficulty proving a valid sex-based discrimination claim in federal 
court.6 This difficulty arises because one cannot perceive sex, gender, 
and sexuality without muddling the stereotypes associated with each 
one.7 Social science can help separate gender and sex characteristics 
from sexual characteristics; these distinctions expose deeper social biases 
toward sex, gender, and sexuality. 
This Comment examines one of these characteristics: the male 
voice.8 Discrimination based on the sound of one’s voice tends to force 
men to conform their voices to male stereotypes, a process known as 
covering.9 For men, this means sounding like a masculine heterosexual 
                                                                                                                            
reveal us and the world that we do not measure up, that we are not real men.” Michael S. Kimmel, 
Masculinity as Homophobia, in PRIVILEGE: A READER 51, 63 (Michael S. Kimmel & Abby L. Fer-
ber eds., 2003). 
 5. See infra Part III.B. Many other federal and state laws do not protect sexual minorities in 
employment as well as housing and public accommodation, for example. See Jennifer Levi & Daniel 
Redman, The Cross-Dressing Case for Bathroom Equality, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 133, 135 (2010). 
 6. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court created a burden shifting frame-
work in which the plaintiff always carries the burden of persuasion in Title VII claims. 411 U.S. 792, 
802 (1973). First, the plaintiff must prove his prima facie case by showing, in general, that he is a 
member of a protected class, and that some adverse employment action occurred against him by 
virtue of being a member of that class. Id. The employer must then produce evidence showing a 
legitimate reason for the adverse action. Id. If the employer meets this burden, then the plaintiff must 
show that the employer’s stated reason is a pretext for illegitimate discrimination. Id. The differences 
between proving a retaliation, harassment, or disparate treatment/impact claim is irrelevant for the 
purposes of this Comment, but the McDonnell framework will change slightly depending on which 
type of claim the plaintiff brings. 
 7. For example, masculinity continues to be defined by its fear of femininity. This fear results 
in the following characteristics: emotional restriction, health care problems, obsession with 
achievement and success, restricted sexual and affectionate behavior, socialized control and power 
issues, and homophobia. James M. O’Neil et al., Gender-Role Conflict Scale: College Men’s Fear of 
Femininity, in COLLEGE MEN AND MASCULINITIES: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
PRACTICE 32–34 (2010). 
 8. This Comment will only examine men’s voices because there has been less linguistic re-
search on lesbian phonetics. Further, because society generally views lesbianism differently from 
male homosexuality, a different sexuality and gender analysis of women’s voices would be required. 
That is a subject matter for a different article. 
 9. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE. L.J. 769, 878–923 (2002); see also Joan W. 
Howarth, Recruiting Sexual Minorities and People with Disabilities to Be Dean, 31 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 751, 752–53 (2008). Howarth states as follows: 
Perhaps the most vexing questions that some people with hidden disabilities and some 
members of LGBT communities may face relate to visibility, passing, secrecy, privacy, 
and disclosure. Deliberate disclosure of personal information (otherwise known as “com-
ing out”) may be central for members of both groups. The irrelevance of being gay or be-
ing disabled is not securely established, so communication about these aspects of one’s 
life may be challenging. Even in welcoming contexts, the LGBT or disabled applicant 
may face decisions about how to discuss that aspect of his or her identity, if at all. 
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man.10 These attempts at covering or negotiating one’s identity can have 
deleterious effects on employee self-identity, work productivity, and 
ability to bring discrimination claims in the future.11   
We perceive identity by comparing behavior to stereotypes. Socio-
linguist Kathryn Campbell-Kibler describes this interaction between 
identity and stereotype as “style.”12 In particular, “[l]inguistic cues are 
tied, not to sexual orientation, but to recognizable ways of being in the 
world—in other words, to styles. Sexual Orientation merely represents 
one piece of information that may (or may not) be implicated in a stylis-
tic performance.”13 Employers are no different from the rest of society.14 
They not only respond to identity status, such as sex, but also to stereo-
typical conduct, such as sounding like a man should sound. 
Federal courts have addressed alleged discrimination partly based 
on a male employee’s gay or effeminate voice in six cases, with mixed 
results. This Comment argues that when male employees are discrimi-
nated against partly based on their voice being perceived as gay—what I 
term the gay accent15—this discrimination should be seen as sex discrim-
                                                                                                                            
See Howarth, supra, at 752–53. 
 10. See, e.g., Kimmel, supra note 4, at 57 (explaining gender from a power relations/hegemony 
approach, Kimmel asserts that “[w]ithin the dominant culture, the masculinity that defines white, 
middle class, early middle-aged, heterosexual men is the masculinity that sets the standard for other 
men, against which other men are measured and, more often than not, found wanting”); Ann C. 
McGinley, Work, Caregiving, and Masculinities, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 703, 707 (2011). McGinle 
explains masculinities theory: 
[It] recognizes that certain practices are normative. Masculinity prescriptions affect men 
and women of different races, ethnic backgrounds, classes, and sexual orientations in dif-
ferent ways. For many men, defining oneself as ‘masculine’ requires proof of two nega-
tives: that one is not feminine or a girl, and that one is not gay. 
McGinley, supra, at 707. 
 11. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000). 
 12. Kathryn Campbell-Kibler, Intersecting Variables and Perceived Sexual Orientation in 
Men, 86 AM. SPEECH 1, 54 (2011). 
 13. Id. 
 14. M.V. Lee Badgett, Brad Sears, Holning Lau & Deborah Ho, Bias in the Workplace: Con-
sistent Evidence of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Discrimination 1998–2008, 84 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 559 (2009). This article summarizes social science data published since the 1980s that 
document discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people in the 
workplace. Since the mid-1990s, fifteen studies found that 15% to 43% of LBG (not transgender) 
respondents experienced discrimination in the workplace. Id. at 559. “[Eight to 17%] were fired or 
denied employment, 10% to 28% were denied a promotion or given negative performance evalua-
tions, 7% to 41% were verbally/physically abused or had their workplace vandalized, and 10% to 
19% reported receiving unequal pay or benefits.” Id. at 559–60. 
 15. In the context of employment discrimination, this Comment includes soft, effeminate, 
feminine, non-masculine, lispy, and high-pitched voices in the definition of gay accent. While these 
are not necessarily technical characteristics of gay phonetics, they are common stereotypes of the 
accent. 
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ination through a mixed-motive analysis.16 The gay accent is a gender 
construction; it is not tied to sexual orientation.17 Having a gay accent 
does not mean that a man is homosexual. To adhere to the purpose of 
Title VII, courts should consider the behavior of the allegedly gay em-
ployee, actions of the harasser, and modern understandings of bias when 
ruling whether a legitimate sex discrimination claim exists.18 Using this 
more holistic approach, courts should be wary to dismiss pleadings or 
enter summary judgment for employers; rather, courts should submit the-
se ambiguous cases to a jury. 
To reach this conclusion, Part II will first examine sociolinguistic 
studies defining the gay accent, society’s perceptions of the gay accent, 
and then the accent’s possible causes. Part III first discusses the bounda-
ry between sex and sexual orientation discrimination, and then outlines 
gay-accent jurisprudence. Part IV argues for a more holistic view of cir-
cumstances surrounding the harassment of gay male employees, thereby 
showing that Title VII protects those harassed on account of their gay 
accent. Part V concludes. 
 II. GAY PHONETICS 
A. Evolution of Gay Linguistics 
Sociolinguistic studies on gay speech have evolved from document-
ing word choice to a more phonetic approach by measuring acoustic dif-
ferences between gay and straight speech.19 Within these newer studies, 
surveys tend to compare either gay men and straight men20 or gay men 
and straight women.21 Typically, listeners rate and describe the voice 
they hear from individual words or a variety of passages.22 When one of 
two speakers is perceived as sounding more gay than the other, for ex-
                                                        
 16. See infra Part III.A. 
 17. See infra Part II.B. 
 18. This argument applies to disparate treatment, harassment, and retaliation claims, even 
though gay accent cases have all involved harassment and retaliation claims. This analysis, however, 
proposes to reach disparate impact claims in theory only, given the practical difficulty in finding, 
gathering, and measuring accent samples within a workplace or community. 
 19. See Don Kulick, Gay and Lesbian Language, 29 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 243 (2000). 
 20. See Campbell-Kibler, supra note 12; Rudolf P. Gaudio, Pitch Properties in the Speech of 
Gay and Straight Men, 69 AM. SPEECH 1 (1994); Erez Levon, Sexuality in Context: Variation and 
the Sociolinguistic Perception of Identity, 36 LANGUAGE SOC’Y 533 (2007); Benjamin Munson, The 
Acoustic Correlates of Perceived Masculinity, Perceived Femininity, and Perceived Sexual Orienta-
tion, 50 LANGUAGE & SPEECH 1 (2007). 
 21. Ron Smyth & Henry Rogers, Do Gay-Sounding Men Speak Like Women?, 27 TORONTO 
WORKING PAPERS LINGUISTICS 129 (2008). 
 22. Campbell-Kibler, supra note 12; Gaudio, supra note 20; Munson, supra note 20. 
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ample, the study directors compare the differences between the two sets 
of voices in order to find which vocal markings are distinct.23 Some lin-
guists, however, isolate one acoustic marker, digitally manipulate it, and 
play the recordings to listeners to gauge their perceptions based on the 
change in one marker.24 But a combination of markings is also likely to 
change perceptions and thus skew some studies’ results.25 As the relevant 
literature develops, sociolinguists are also taking into account that a gay 
man’s speech, like any speech, depends on his audience, his subject mat-
ter, and his geographic influences.26 Ultimately, social context and meth-
odology can make it difficult to pinpoint gay-accent markings. 
Despite problems with cementing definite linguistic markings in the 
gay accent, sociolinguistic research can provide some general conclu-
sions. The acoustic markers typically analyzed in gay speech studies are: 
(1) consonants /s/,27 /z/,28 and /l/;29 (2) formant vowels;30 (3) pitch;31 (4) 
frequency;32 (5) /ing/;33 (6) voice onset time;34 and (7) the neutral schwa 
                                                        
 23. See, e.g., Gaudio, supra note 20. 
 24. Levon, supra note 20. 
 25. Campbell-Kibler, supra note 12, at 54. 
 26. Id. 
 27. The /s/ is pronounced as in the word “silly.” It is a fricative sound, in that there is friction 
without stopping air flow. SANDRA WILDE, WHAT’S A SCHWA SOUND ANYWAY? A HOLISTIC GUIDE 
TO PHONETICS, PHONICS, AND SPELLING 11–12 (1997). 
 28. The /z/ is pronounced as in the word “pizzazz.” It too is a fricative. Id. 
 29. The /l/ is pronounced as in the word “lovely.” It is a liquid sound, in that the airstream is 
interrupted but with no friction. Id. at 15. How the /l/ sound is produced with the tongue varies great-
ly from speaker to speaker. Id. 
 30. There are two general types of pitches produced by humans. PETER LADEFOGED, A 
COURSE IN PHONETICS 21–23 (5th ed. 2006). The first pitch created occurs from the vibration of the 
vocal chords when the sound is first uttered. Id. The second type consists of overtone pitches that are 
created by and vary dramatically based on the resonating cavities of the vocal tract. Id. While diffi-
cult to differentiate, vocal chord pitch can be heard in regular speaking while the vocal tract pitch 
can be heard by itself when whispering or creaking one’s voice (because the vocal chords do not 
vibrate during whisper or creaking). Id. The vocal tract overtone pitches are further characterized by 
two overtone pitches, which are called formant vowels (only two overtones are widely seen to have a 
large impact on vowel formation, but depending on the vowel, there can be up to six overtones). Id. 
The first (F1) is a lower pitch, corresponds to tongue placement being close or far from the roof of 
your mouth, and can be heard in a creaky voice. Id. The second (F2) is higher, corresponds to tongue 
placement close or far from your teeth, and can be heard when whispering. Id. Formant vowel 
sounds, dependent on vocal tract shape and tongue placement, create the difference in vowel sounds 
and much of the distinctness that we hear in people’s voices. Id. 
 31. When sociolinguistic researchers used the word pitch by itself, they referred to all pitch 
forms combined, as described in note 30 above. Pitch range, or intonation, refers to the near simulta-
neous use of lower and higher pitches in the same word or phrase. Id. at 23. 
 32. Frequency measures the peaks in the waves of air pressure in a given period of time. Id. 
Pitch and frequency tend to correspond with each other in that a higher frequency (more waves per 
minute) tends to go hand in hand with a higher pitch. Id. 
 33. The /ing/ sound is made by voicing the gerund form of verbs, such as the word making. 
Campbell-Kibler, supra note 12, at 55. 
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sound.35 Using these markings, researchers have asked listeners to rate 
voices, along a spectrum or by means of a binary choice, as masculine or 
feminine, gay or straight, and other social perceptions. 
B. Perceptions and Realities of the Gay Accent 
Gay-accent studies have attempted to corroborate or dispel common 
social stereotypes of the gay accent, namely the /s/ sound and pitch. 
Some linguists analyzed these sounds by recording listener perceptions 
on a masculine-feminine spectrum, a gay-straight spectrum, or both. 
Others empirically compared speech differences between gay and 
straight men. 
First, Campbell-Kibler’s study, representative of /s/ phonetic analy-
sis,36 found that /s/-fronting created a perception in speakers as being less 
masculine and more gay sounding.37 It also found that /s/-fronting made 
the speaker sound less competent, but /s/-fronting and /s/-backing made 
the speaker sound less confident than a mid-/s/ sound.38 The study’s au-
thor notes, however, that perceptions of /s/-fronting may have been influ-
enced by common social perceptions of the gay lisp.39 Moreover, listen-
ers are influenced by clusters of speech patterns, not simply by the use of 
/s/-fronting. Combining the phonetic variables of /s/-fronting, /s/-
backing, and /ing/ showed that the more masculine one was perceived, 
the more competent he was also perceived.40 Also, using that same pho-
netic combination, the less masculine a man was perceived, the more gay 
he was also perceived.41 
                                                                                                                            
 34. Voice onset time is measured by aspiration: a period of voicelessness after the articulation 
of a consonant and before the articulation of the following vowel. For example, there is a longer 
aspiration, and thus longer voice onset time, in the word ‘pie’ than in ‘buy’ and in ‘tie’ than in ‘die.’ 
In ‘pie’ and ‘tie’ you can feel more air come out between the consonant and the following vowel 
sound. LADEFOGED, supra note 30, at 56, 146. 
 35. The schwa sound is a weak mid-central vowel sound occurring in unaccented syllables, 
such as the first syllable of about when said in a sentence or the third and fourth syllables in esopha-
gus. No part of the mouth, lips, or tongue move to form the schwa sound. WILDE, supra note 27, at 
xv–xvi. 
 36. A consonant sound can be emphasized in words, such as when the /s/ sound in the word 
‘silly’ is stressed in a particular manner. Campbell-Kibler, supra note 12, at 58. This is known as /s/ 
fronting. Id. Conversely, emphasizing the /s/ sound in ‘apples’ is known as /s/ backing. Id. 
 37. Id. Campbell-Kibler’s study digitally manipulated four different male voices to vary /s/, /z/, 
and /ing/ markings, in which 285 online participants responded in the two phases of the study. Id. at 
58–59. 
 38. Id. at 59. 
 39. Id. at 58. 
 40. Id. at 61. 
 41. Id. 
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Studies also debate about whether these perceptions correlate with 
actual sexuality. Gaudio’s small, early study found that there was no 
pitch difference between what sounded masculine or feminine, and no 
pitch difference between gay and straight men.42 The study did find, 
however, that there was a strong correlation between sounding gay, 
sounding feminine, and actually being gay.43 But many of these correla-
tions are dependent on the type of passage being read: technical or dra-
matic.44 In contrast, Smyth and Rogers’s more comprehensive study 
found a 
gaydar accuracy rate of only about 57% for a sample of 46 listeners, 
despite the fact that they exhibited a good deal of agreement about 
which voices sounded gay. According to our listeners’ ratings, most 
straight men and many gay men sounded straight; some gay men 
sounded gay, to varying degrees, and some straight men also sound-
ed gay. Some men had voices that were not clearly marked as either 
gay- or straight-sounding.45 
Second, rather than attempting to correlate perceived and real sexu-
ality, other linguists have used an empirical method to find linguistic dif-
ferences between gay and straight men. Rendall, Vasey, and McKenzie’s 
study found that gay men had a higher F1 pitch in the vowel sound beet 
and a higher F2 pitch in the vowel sounds butt and boat.46 Both pitches, 
however, were distinct in the schwa sound: F1 was lower, F2 was high-
er.47 Yet the study noted that, because the gay men in its sample were 
shorter on average than the straight men, and because height affects the 
length of the vocal tract and thus pitch, differences in formant vowel 
pitches are likely not statistically significant.48 But as Levon’s study con-
cluded, high variation in pitch range is more of an indicator of a gay ac-
cent than mere high or low pitch by itself.49 
                                                        
 42. Gaudio, supra note 20, at 50. 
 43. Id. at 48. Gaudio’s sample group included only eight male speakers (four straight and four 
gay) and thirteen listeners. Id. at 43–44. 
 44. Id. at 54. The technical reading in this study was an accounting manual, and the dramatic 
passage was the script from a play. Id. 
 45. Smyth & Rogers, supra note 21, at 130. This study’s sample consisted of forty-six listeners 
rating eight straight speakers and seventeen gay speakers. Id. at 133. 
 46. Drew Rendall, Paul L. Vasey & Jared McKenzie, The Queen’s English: An Alternative, 
Biosocial Hypothesis for the Distinctive Features of “Gay Speech,” 37 ARCH. SEX. BEHAV. 188, 
194–95 (2008). The authors studied thirty-four straight men and twenty-nine gay men. Id. at 191. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 197. 
 49. Levon, supra note 20, at 546. Levon’s study used ten listeners and one digitally manipulat-
ed voice. Id. at 537. 
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These findings show that the gay accent is not easily distinguisha-
ble; there is no one gay accent. A voice may have all or one of the char-
acteristics and be perceived as gay or straight, masculine or feminine. 
Even then, any conclusion must also take into account the differences in 
listener audio capabilities. Nevertheless, the studies do show a positive 
correlation between sounding gay and sounding feminine, and likely no 
correlation between sounding gay or feminine and actually being gay. 
C. Possible Causes of the Gay Accent 
Two studies discuss the possible causes of the gay accent. Without 
delving into a deep Freudian analysis, explanations fall into the physio-
logical, the social, or a combination of the two. Linguists rely on the un-
derstanding that vowel and frequency markings are based on physical 
differences found in vocal tracts.50 In contrast, consonants are sociologi-
cally dictated, as they are made in the mouth.51 By showing that gay 
male, gay-sounding male, straight male, and straight female phonetics 
largely coincided or diverged with consonant sounds, Smyth and Rogers 
found that there is no physiological difference between gay and straight 
male vocal tracts and no physiological similarity with gay male and 
straight female vocal tracts.52 Yet, preadolescent boys and girls have the 
same shaped vocal tracts, and boys have lower frequencies.53 As an ex-
planation of this contradiction, the study concludes that preadolescent 
children may learn to speak from adult male and female models, just as 
any child learns how to speak from her community, and that biological 
traits can be unconsciously manipulated.54 
Rendall, Vasey, and McKenzie agreed that a combination of social 
and physical variables create a gay accent.55 Because their study found 
only minor variations in certain vowel formants, it hypothesized that dif-
ferences in hormone processes between gay and straight adolescents 
caused further physiological, neurological, and psychobehavioral chang-
es later in life.56 These psychobehavioral traits affect physical and social 
assertiveness.57 The slight differences in vowel formants are affected ei-
ther by lip protrusion and retraction during speech or, relatedly, by facial 
                                                        
 50. Smyth & Rogers, supra note 21, at 139. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 140. 
 55. See Rendall, Vasey & McKenzie, supra note 46, at 199. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
2013] The Gay Accent, Gender, and Title VII Discrimination 1951 
expressions.58 The study explained this concept of unconscious social 
assertiveness: 
Facial expressions with greater lip protrusion are associated cross-
culturally, and across species, with more threatening, assertive or 
aggressive demeanors, and lower frequency voices are associated 
with greater social assertiveness and potency through their broader 
association with larger bodied individuals, such as with men versus 
women, or with adults versus children. In contrast, facial expres-
sions with greater lip retraction are associated cross-culturally, and 
across species, with less threatening or less assertive demeanors, 
and higher frequency voices are associated with reduced social as-
sertiveness and potency through their broader association with 
smaller bodied individuals, such as with women versus men; and 
with children versus adults.59 
The study then hypothesized that gay men speak with greater lip retrac-
tion than straight men.60 It notes, however, that this explanation is quite 
speculative.61 Ultimately, gay speech is affected by complex social and 
physical variables: attempted imitation of straight women at adolescence, 
attempted imitation of other gay men later in life, and hormonal differ-
ences that accompany different sexualities.62 
The few studies hypothesizing the cause of the gay accent, like 
those studies trying to define it, present as many questions as answers. It 
may be that children are forced into certain vocal characteristics as they 
develop, but are still left with subconscious vocal choices, such as con-
sonant markings. Gay and straight males are imitating, acquiring, indi-
vidualizing, and discarding the same vocal markings, and they are forced 
into others based on minute physical differences in the vocal organs. 
While the causes of the gay accent can be contingent on sexual orienta-
tion as much as on gender consciousness, perceptions related to the gay 
accent determine the ultimate reason behind this discrimination: gender 
stereotypes. The gay accent and gender are inseparable. 
                                                        
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 199–200. 
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III. GAY-ACCENT JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Gender Discrimination and Mixed Motives 
On its face, Title VII does not protect employees who are subject to 
gender discrimination.63 But in the 1989 case Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins, the Supreme Court ruled that gender discrimination equated to sex-
based discrimination, a protected category under Title VII.64 The female 
plaintiff was denied a promotion to become partner in her accounting 
firm, despite her seemingly strong work performance.65 In determining 
whether candidates, like Hopkins, should receive partnership, the current 
partners would submit comments about whether they thought the candi-
date should be promoted.66 But before she submitted her application for 
partnership, Hopkins received evaluations critiquing her aggressive and 
abrasive interaction with colleagues.67 While it was these interpersonal 
skills that caused the firm to reject her partnership application, some 
partners’ comments also indicated that they did not like her interpersonal 
skills because of her sex.68 They described her as seeming macho, need-
ing to enroll in charm school, and using profanity too often.69 Finally, 
one comment suggested that Hopkins should walk, talk, and dress more 
femininely, put on make-up, wear jewelry, and style her hair to improve 
her chances at receiving partnership.70 Dispelling the employer’s argu-
ment that gender stereotyping was not a cognizable claim under Title 
VII, the Court pragmatically reasoned that “we are beyond the day when 
an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they 
matched the stereotype associated with their group.”71 
The Court found it unclear, however, whether Hopkins’s firm 
would have still denied her partnership even if it had not exercised gen-
der stereotyping in its decisionmaking process.72 The Court ruled that 
this “mixed-motive” situation required the employer to prove, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that it would have made the same employ-
ment decision despite the partial discriminatory reasons.73 The 1991 
                                                        
 63. Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a). 
 64. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989). 
 65. Id. at 233–34. 
 66. Id. at 233. 
 67. Id. at 234–35. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 235. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 251. 
 72. Id. at 252–53. 
 73. Id. at 253. 
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amendments to Title VII, however, in response to the Court’s ruling in 
Hopkins, partially altered the mixed-motive analysis.74 Now, a plaintiff 
need only show that the employer’s decision was based on a combination 
of legitimate and illegitimate motives in order to receive relief, however 
limited; whether or not the employer would have made the same decision 
absent discrimination is no longer relevant. 75 
This mixed-motive liability is relevant in instances of gay-accent 
discrimination. In cases involving gay-accent discrimination, it is diffi-
cult to decipher if the employer acted based on an employee’s gender-
based traits—an illegitimate reason—or sexuality-based traits—a legiti-
mate reason—or both. 
B. The Vickers “Readily Demonstrable” Test 
Despite the availability of a mixed-motive analysis, courts are 
mindful not to bootstrap sexual-orientation-discrimination claims onto 
sex discrimination claims. Most prominently, the Sixth Circuit in Vickers 
v. Fairfield Medical Center defined the line between sex and sexual ori-
entation discrimination.76 In Vickers, the plaintiff, a private police officer 
at a medical center, befriended a gay male doctor at the center and helped 
him investigate a claim of sexual misconduct that the doctor asserted had 
occurred against him.77 Once Vickers’s coworkers found out about his 
friendship with the doctor, they began making derogatory remarks 
against Vickers, claiming he was gay, and questioning his masculinity.78 
His coworkers also groped him, took and shared photos taken while 
handcuffing and simulating sex with him, and shoved a stuffed animal in 
his crotch after the coworkers simulated sex with it.79 After reporting the 
incidents to human resources and being denied any practical remedy to 
the harassment, Vickers was warned by human resources that a personnel 
action would be taken against him if he filed a lawsuit against the medi-
                                                        
 74. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 107, Pub.L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1981). 
 75. Id. Section 706(g)(2)(B) of Title VII states that no court shall order damages of back pay, 
reinstatement, or admission to employment for mixed-motive plaintiffs, but declaratory and injunc-
tive relief, attorney’s fees, and costs may be granted. 
 76. 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006). The Vickers court cited several opinions, including Hopkins, 
that supposedly conformed to the readily demonstrable test including Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 
398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005), and Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004). The 
Vickers rule has been followed by several district courts and at least one recent Sixth Circuit case. 
See, e.g., Gilbert v. Country Music Ass’n, Inc., 432 F. App’x 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 77. Vickers, 453 F.3d at 759. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 759–60. 
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cal center.80 Vickers then resigned.81 The court held that this harassment 
was purely based on Vickers’s perceived sexual orientation.82 The court 
reasoned that, 
[u]ltimately, recognition of Vickers’ claim would have the effect of 
de facto amending Title VII to encompass sexual orientation as a 
prohibited basis for discrimination. In all likelihood, any discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation would be actionable under a sex 
stereotyping theory if this claim is allowed to stand, as all homo-
sexuals, by definition, fail to conform to traditional gender norms in 
their sexual practices.83 
According to the court, the test for determining gender discrimination is 
whether gender nonconforming traits were “readily demonstrable” 
through appearance or behavior, as implied by the court in Hopkins.84 
Vickers did not allege that he acted or behaved effeminately, causing the 
court to affirm dismissal of his claim.85 
This boundary focuses on the victim’s behavior and actions. As will 
be discussed in Part IV, this incomplete approach leads to denial of valid 
sex-based discrimination claims of homosexual employees and does not 
conform to the goals of Title VII. 
C. Gay-Accent Cases 
Federal courts have been inconsistent over whether to find a legiti-
mate claim for Title VII violations when presented with factual scenarios 
that include gay accents. Although the jurisprudence is not extensive, the 
courts that considered such an issue have typically discounted the gen-
dered nature of gay-accent discrimination, even when considering a 
mixed-motive employment decision. 
Three approaches are analyzed below. In the first approach, the two 
courts that discussed the gay accent in dicta reasoned that discrimination 
based on the feminine sound of a man’s voice should be actionable as 
gender-based discrimination. In the second set of cases, three courts 
found only sexual orientation discrimination in cases involving a gay 
accent. Last, the one court that found sex-based discrimination did so 
through a mixed-motive analysis. 
                                                        
 80. Id. at 760. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 764. 
 84. Id. at 763. 
 85. Id. at 764. 
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1. Cases in Which Courts Hypothesized About the Gay Accent in Dicta 
In the first set of cases, two courts stated in dicta that discrimination 
based on a man’s soft or effeminate voice would create an actionable 
claim under Title VII as sex-based discrimination if supported by suffi-
cient facts.86 First, in Doe by Doe v. City of Belleville, the Seventh Cir-
cuit stated, 
[A] man who is harassed because his voice is soft, his physique is 
slight, his hair is long, or because in some other respect he exhibits 
his masculinity in a way that does not meet his coworkers’ idea of 
how men are to appear and behave, is harassed ‘because of’ his 
sex.87 
Second, the court in E.E.O.C. v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc. implied that 
comments based on a feminine voice would create a cognizable claim for 
sex discrimination.88 In that case, however, the plaintiff’s coworker 
“never told him that he was not sufficiently manly, had female manner-
isms, acted like a woman, or had a feminine voice,” which caused the 
court to find that the coworker did not discriminate based on sex.89 This 
Comment agrees that harassment based on a feminine voice creates a 
cognizable sex discrimination claim. But both of these courts focused 
only on the actions of the alleged victim or the actions of the alleged har-
asser. Just like the Vickers rule, these approaches are erroneously narrow, 
as will be discussed in Part IV. 
2. Cases in Which Courts Found Only Sexual Orientation Discrimination 
In the second set of gay-accent cases, three courts have held that the 
discrimination against an employee because of his effeminate voice was 
wholly based on perceived sexual orientation and thus not actionable 
under Title VII. 
In Anderson v. Napolitano,90 the plaintiff, who was an air marshal 
named Anderson, claimed that his supervisor, Bauer, shunned and isolat-
ed him at work after learning of Anderson’s homosexual orientation.91 
Bauer publicly called him a “fag” and told others not to associate with 
                                                        
 86. Doe by Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated on other grounds 
and remanded by 523 U.S. 1001 (1998); E.E.O.C. v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-2569-
TWT, 2008 WL 4098723 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2008). 
 87. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d at 581. 
 88. Family Dollar Stores, 2008 WL 4098723, at *3. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Anderson v. Napolitano, No. 09-60744-CIV, 2010 WL 431898, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 
2010). 
 91. Id. 
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him.92 One colleague then told Anderson that he “had been informed via 
upper management that he was not to socialize with Anderson if he 
‘knew what was good for him and his career,’ and the reason given was 
Anderson’s sexuality.”93 In one instance of harassment, after denouncing 
Anderson for bringing attention to subordinates’ complaints of racial dis-
crimination, Bauer told Anderson that he was too gay and too flamboy-
ant.94 In another incident, Anderson heard two colleagues lisping and 
saying in a “stereotypically flamboyant voice, ‘Oh my God, we’ve got to 
clean up in here now,’” as they entered the room where Anderson was 
working.95 They immediately stopped talking when they saw Anderson.96 
After filing a complaint for sexuality discrimination with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in 2006, and receiving a 
demotion at work in 2008, Anderson filed another complaint with the 
EEOC later that year for retaliation based on the original filing.97 Be-
cause sexual orientation discrimination is not a cognizable claim under 
Title VII, the EEOC dismissed the claim.98 
In May 2009, Anderson filed a complaint in the Southern District of 
Florida, claiming Title VII sex discrimination and retaliation.99 A few 
months earlier he had retired on medical disability, receiving disability 
payments at a lower rate due to his demotion.100 In 2010, the court en-
tered summary judgment for Anderson’s employer, holding that Ander-
son’s claim of sex discrimination was based on his sexual orientation and 
thus not protected under Title VII.101 Despite considering a mixed motive 
for the discrimination, the court held that Anderson’s allegations of har-
assment and discrimination were based solely on sexual orientation.102 
Specifically, it found that the lisping colleagues were making fun of gay 
stereotypes, not female stereotypes, because lisping is not associated 
with women.103 
In the next case, Dandan v. Radisson Hotel Lisle, the plaintiff 
Dandan sued Radisson Hotels for sex discrimination and retaliation in 
                                                        
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at *2. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at *2–3. 
 98. Id. at *3. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at *7. 
 102. Id. at *5. 
 103. Id. at *6. 
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the Northern District of Illinois.104 In 1995, Radisson employed him as 
an assistant bartender, working alongside his colleague Zoellner.105 Be-
ginning in early 1996, Zoellner repeatedly called him “fagboy,” “fruit-
cake,” and “Tinkerbell.”106 Several months later, Zoellner became 
Dandan’s supervisor: 
This is when Zoellner’s insults intensified in their cruelty. Dandan 
testified that Zoellner’s insults progressed from name-calling to 
very graphic insults, such as:  “didn’t your boyfriend do you last 
night?”; “shove [a vacuum cleaner hose] up  your a”; “take [a 
tube lubricator] home, you’ll have fun with it”; “do you want to eat 
this [pointing to his crotch]? Eat this, Eddie”; “I hate you because 
you are a faggot.” Zoellner also criticized Dandan’s speech patterns 
and kinesics for being feminine. Dandan alleges that Zoellner’s in-
sults occurred nearly every day.107 
Zoellner transferred shifts and stopped his harassment after being 
disciplined by his supervisors.108 Once Zoellner transferred, however, the 
kitchen staff started harassing Dandan in the same vein as Zoellner.109 
Dandan complained to his supervisor again and most of the insults 
stopped.110 But in late 1997, the restaurant’s manager suspended Dandan 
for two weeks for chewing gum, which normally would have only war-
ranted a three- to five-day suspension.111 
The court granted summary judgment for the employer, holding 
that while same-sex harassment is actionable under Title VII, Dandan did 
not assert facts that this harassment occurred because he was male, but 
rather asserted facts that harrassment occurred because he was perceived 
as gay.112 
Third, in Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products Inc., the plaintiff 
Hamm filed suit under Title VII for harassment and retaliation against 
his employer, a dairy producer.113 Eventually, Hamm’s work perfor-
mance decreased and coworkers began harassing him, allegedly com-
menting on his high-pitched voice and calling him “faggot,” “bisexual,” 
                                                        
 104. Dandan v. Radisson Hotel Lisle, No. 97 C 8342, 2000 WL 336528, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 
28, 2000). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at *2. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at *4. 
 113. Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1059 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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“girl scout,” and “kid.”114 However, one coworker claimed that he only 
commented on the high-pitched voice Hamm used while yelling.115 
Hamm’s supervisors disciplined him for horseplay and poor work per-
formance, requesting that he act as a team player.116 After this discipline, 
Hamm began filing complaints with the Wisconsin Equal Rights Divi-
sion and Weyauwega management.117 The harassment continued during 
these filings, which included a coworker threatening Hamm with a pipe 
and another spraying him with water from a hose.118 Then in mid-1999, 
Weyauwega terminated Hamm and offered him a severance package.119 
In contrast to the court in Dandan, the court in Hamm characterized 
the coworker comments as work-related disputes that occurred because 
of Hamm’s poor work performance.120 The court also discounted many 
of the comments because the dairy plant was pervasive with horseplay 
and pranks: “Of course we do not mean to suggest that the presence of 
horseplay in a workplace precludes a claim of sexual harassment, but we 
do recognize that, in some cases, sexually explicit remarks among male 
coworkers may be ‘simply expressions of animosity or juvenile provoca-
tion.’”121 Additionally, the court ruled that Hamm’s supervisor calling 
him a “girl scout” was not sex discrimination because the supervisor re-
ferred to all employees, who were mostly male, as “girl scouts.”122 The 
court determined that Hamm was harassed because of his poor work per-
formance and perceived sexual orientation, affirming summary judgment 
for the employer.123 
The courts in Anderson, Dandan, and Hamm incorrectly applied or 
even failed to consider a mixed-motive analysis. Most harassing com-
ments were directed at the plaintiffs’ perceived sexual orientation, but 
not all. Some comments were directed at the sound of the plaintiffs’ 
voices or were directed at their masculinity in general, and for that rea-
son, the courts should have submitted the case to the fact finder to deter-
mine if at least one motive was based on gender. 
                                                        
 114. Id. at 1059–61, 1068 n.4. 
 115. Id. at 1068 n.4. 
 116. Id. at 1060. 
 117. Id. at 1060–61. 
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 122. Id. at 1064. 
 123. Id. 
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3. A Case in Which the Court Used Mixed-Motive Analysis 
Recently, the Third Circuit in Prowel v. Wise Business Forms ap-
plied a mixed-motive analysis in a Title VII gay-accent case and denied 
the employer’s motion for summary judgment.124 In this case, the plain-
tiff, Prowel, began working for Wise Business Forms, Inc., a producer 
and distributor of business forms, in 1991.125 On summary judgment, the 
court took Prowel’s self-description as true: 
In stark contrast to the other men at Wise, Prowel testified that he 
had a high voice and did not curse; was very well-groomed; wore 
what others would consider dressy clothes; was neat; filed his nails 
instead of ripping them off with a utility knife; crossed his legs and 
had a tendency to shake his foot “the way a woman would sit”; 
walked and carried himself in an effeminate manner; drove a clean 
car; had a rainbow decal on the trunk of his car; talked about things 
like art, music, interior design, and decor; and pushed the buttons on 
the nale encoder with “pizzazz.”126 
The court also took Prowel’s account of the harassment as true.127 
He stated that coworkers called him “princess,” “rosebud,” and “fag” and 
made fun of his manner of walking, the way he crossed his legs, and 
what he wore.128 Gay personal ads from the newspaper129 appeared on his 
desk and workstation as well as prayer notes and messages stating that he 
was a sinner and would burn in hell.130 A pink feather tiara was left at his 
workstation with a bottle of personal lubricant.131 He also overheard 
coworkers state that they hated Prowel and that they should “shoot all the 
fags,” and one supervisor stated that he disapproved of Prowel’s life-
style.132 Finally, messages stating that Prowel had AIDS and was having 
sex with male coworkers were written on the bathroom walls.133 In late 
2004, Prowel was fired for lack of available work.134 He then filed suit 
alleging sex and religious discrimination and retaliation under Title 
VII.135 
                                                        
 124. Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 125. Id. at 286. 
 126. Id. at 287. 
 127. Id. at 291. 
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While the court for the Western District of Pennsylvania entered 
summary judgment for his employer because it found that the discrimina-
tion was based on Prowel’s perceived sexual orientation, the Third Cir-
cuit reversed.136 Noting that the line between sex and sexual orientation 
can be difficult to draw and taking into consideration the Vickers rule, 
the Prowel court reasoned that its task was to determine if a reasonable 
fact finder could find only sex or sexual orientation discrimination or 
both.137 The court found an issue of material fact over the nature of the 
harassment, holding that the case should be submitted to the fact find-
er.138 The court stated its rule: 
There is no basis in the statutory or case law to support the notion 
that an effeminate heterosexual man can bring a gender stereotyping 
claim while an effeminate homosexual man may not. As long as the 
employee—regardless of his  or her sexual orientation—marshals 
sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could conclude that 
harassment or discrimination occurred ‘because of sex,’ the case is 
not appropriate for summary judgment.139 
The rule in Prowel recognizes the inherent ambiguity when sexual 
orientation discrimination is at issue, implying that courts should tread 
carefully when faced with a summary judgment motion from the em-
ployer. Given that only 15% of employment discrimination cases be-
tween 1999 to 2007 ended in a win for the employee—many losing upon 
complaint dismissal or summary judgment—the Third Circuit’s recogni-
tion that alleged sexual orientation discrimination often presents issues of 
material fact is especially important in order to create parity with other 
kinds of cases that average a 51% plaintiff win rate.140 
                                                        
 136. Id. at 291. In reversing, the Third Circuit stated that the district court incorrectly applied 
Hopkins because, while Hopkins provides a legal framework to resolve gender discrimination cases, 
the analysis is more complicated here because the plaintiff in Hopkins was not perceived as homo-
sexual. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 292. Before the decision in Prowel, the Ninth Circuit in Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, 
Inc. articulated a similar need to clearly separate sex-based from sexuality-based conduct in same-
sex sexual harassment cases. See 305 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 140. ADR News, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Do Poorly in Federal Court, Study 
Says, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2008–Jan. 2009, at 9 (citing Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, 
Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 1 (2009)). The authors also note that the win rate for plaintiffs on appeal in employment dis-
crimination cases is under 9%, which is significantly less than the 41% reversal rate for other appel-
lants during the period studied. Id. This disparity, however, can be partly explained by the fact that 
many employment disputes are resolved through alternative dispute resolution, rather than litigation. 
Id. 
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IV. BOOTSTRAPPING SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION 
Mindful of erroneously equating sexual orientation discrimination 
as sex discrimination, this Part argues that inclusion of the gay accent 
still conforms to Congress’s goals of excluding sexual orientation from 
Title VII. First, this Part shows that the Vickers “readily demonstrable” 
test fails to conform to the purposes of Title VII. Second, it argues that 
the Prowel rule’s holistic analytical approach does conform. Finally, this 
Part shows how the gay accent falls within the Prowel rule and why in-
clusion of gay-accent discrimination does not bootstrap sexual orienta-
tion onto Title VII.141 
A. The Inadequacy of the Vickers Readily Demonstrable Test 
The Vickers readily demonstrable test, focusing only on the out-
ward behavior of the victim, fails to conform to Title VII’s goals and 
fails to take into account a mixed motive for the harassment. A more 
comprehensive approach to understanding motives for discrimination 
and bias is necessary. 
First, Title VII aims to “deter unlawful harassment and intentional 
discrimination in the workplace.”142 Deterring discrimination necessarily 
requires probing the mental state of the discriminator. Because people 
rarely state or are able to consciously understand the deeper reasons be-
hind their own biases,143 the Vickers court relied on the actions of Vick-
ers to determine the mental state of his harassers. While outward behav-
ior is relevant, the Supreme Court in Hopkins, contrary to the Vickers 
court’s interpretation, looked to other evidentiary sources, including har-
                                                        
 141. Some scholars have argued for a complete bootstrapping. See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, 
Erasing Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual Minorities, and Employment Discrimination, 43 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 713 (2010) (arguing that sexual orientation should be actionable as sex discrim-
ination based on masculinities theory, in that harassment or employment actions based on sexual 
orientation are in fact based on gender perceptions where white males enforce a masculinities struc-
ture in the workplace). 
 142. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102–166, § 2(1), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
 143. Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-
Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1283, 1341 (2012). Eyer explains that various psycho-
logical studies indicate that the plaintiff success rate of 4% in discrimination cases is so low because 
of a deeper unconscious American belief in meritocracy, as opposed to acceptance of discrimination 
as a reason for one’s actions. This conclusion leads the author to argue that employment remedies 
based on nondiscrimination laws, such as firing for “just cause” provisions or violating the Family 
and Medical Leave Act, are the only way to avoid the problems of discrimination psychology. See 
also Eden B. King et. al., Discrimination in the 21st Century: Are Science and the Law Aligned?, 17 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 54, 58 (2011) (arguing that modern scientific understandings of how 
people discriminate, seen through microaggressive actions, are not accounted for under Title VII 
jurisprudence). 
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asser conduct and more modern understandings of discrimination.144 
Still, it may be that the court in Vickers, as well as in Anderson, Dandan, 
and Hamm, would have reached the same holding even without using the 
readily demonstrable test. But this erroneous test still endures. 
Second, while the Vickers court was quick to point out that the 
Court in Hopkins required outward manifestation of gender non-
conformity, it was also quick to discount the mixed-motive ruling in 
Hopkins, failing to make any mention of it at all. Vickers’s coworkers 
harassed him because they perceived he was gay and because they 
deemed him less masculine. Because possible mixed motives behind 
Vickers’s harassment existed and ambiguity in cases involving possible 
sexual orientation discrimination are common, courts should be wary to 
dismiss claims before a trier of fact has had the opportunity to weigh the 
evidence. 
B. The Prowel Rule Conforms to the Purpose of Title VII 
The Third Circuit in Prowel wisely understood the difficulties in 
deciphering the motives behind discrimination. The court relied on the 
plaintiff’s own testimony regarding his high-pitched voice and effemi-
nate behavior in conjunction with coworker comments.145 Even though 
Prowel never pleaded that his colleagues and supervisors made com-
ments directly teasing him for his voice or for the way he sat or pushed 
buttons, the court recognized that discrimination is not only evident 
through statements made by harassers.146 The court took a more holistic 
look at harasser comments and plaintiff behavior. 
It also took into account modern sex- and gender-based biases. The 
court considered the double standard that homosexual employees face 
when attempting to push forward with a sex-based discrimination 
claim.147 By making clear that a double standard exists for gay employee-
plaintiffs, the Prowel court indicated its understanding of how people 
                                                        
 144. The court in Hopkins looked to harasser comments, victim behavior, and personal experi-
ence working in the legal profession in determining that society has progressed to the point where 
courts should consider gender discrimination as sex discrimination. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989). 
 145. Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 291–92 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Some scholars have already touched upon the issue of double standards. See, e.g., Mary 
Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the 
Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 18, 33, 47 (1995) (arguing that courts treat ef-
feminate men differently from masculine women); Kramer, supra note 3, at 229–33 (arguing that 
there is a double standard against gays in same-sex sexual harassment cases because courts have 
failed to see the heterosexual orientation factor in heterosexual harassment cases). 
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discriminate in the modern workplace. But beyond the personal experi-
ences of judges, this analysis may require the aid of social science. In-
deed, courts have already proposed using modern biological and social 
scientific advances to inform future rulings in Title VII sex discrimina-
tion cases.148 
Separating homosexual behavior as one separates heterosexual be-
havior in a sex discrimination analysis, coupled with application of a 
more holistic approach that considers harasser behavior, victim behavior, 
and modern understandings of bias, can still conform to Title VII’s pur-
pose of deterring sex discrimination. At the least, a homosexual employ-
ee presents enough ambiguity in his sex-based-discrimination claim to 
warrant review beyond summary judgment to the same extent that a het-
erosexual employee does. 
C. The Gay Accent Falls Within the Prowel Rule 
Because the gay accent and perceived effeminacy are so inter-
twined, the gay accent should fall within Prowel’s rule. First, sociolin-
guistic findings update our understanding of discrimination. The gay ac-
cent is associated with effeminacy and is likely not correlated with a 
speaker’s actual sexuality. Second, factual scenarios can contain refer-
ences to the gay accent and also include evidence of victim behavior and 
harasser response. A speaker’s accented speech is readily demonstrable, 
and a listener likely perceives the gay accent as feminine and the speaker 
as gay, possibly commenting one way or another. Even if the harasser 
only describes the accent as “gay” and never describes it as feminine or 
not masculine, at the least, sociolinguistic findings create enough ambi-
guity to warrant review beyond summary judgment.  
Unlike the court in Prowel, the courts in Anderson, Dandan, and 
Hamm relied more on the harassers’ express words than on the gender 
stereotypes perceived by the harassers, especially regarding the sound of 
the victims’ voices.149 In contrast, the courts in City of Belleville, Family 
Dollar Stores, and Prowel150 better understood the relationship between 
gender and sexual orientation. They correctly associated sounding gay 
with sounding feminine. This association does not necessarily mean that 
                                                        
 148. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Scientific 
research may someday cause a shift in the plain meaning of the term ‘sex’ so that it extends beyond 
the two starkly defined categories of male and female.”); Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 
213 (D.D.C. 2006) (“A factual record is required, one that reflects the scientific basis of sexual iden-
tity in general, and gender dysphoria in particular.”). 
 149. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 150. See supra Part III.C.1, C.3. 
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a feminine male voice sounds like a woman, just that it does not adhere 
to masculine stereotypes. For example, the court in Anderson erred in 
reasoning that harassment by imitating a lisp is not gender discrimination 
because women do not stereotypically have a lisp.151 The comparison to 
women is misguided. It is the comparison to male, not female, voice ste-
reotypes that informs listeners’ perceptions of what is masculine and 
what is feminine. 
D. The Gay Accent and the Prowel Rule Do Not Bootstrap  
Sexual Orientation 
Still, the argument that gay-accent discrimination is sex discrimina-
tion asks courts to equate a listener’s perception of sounding gay with 
sounding effeminate. Arguably, this jump in logic from sexuality to sex 
could be made for any gay male behavior, and thus bootstrap sexual ori-
entation discrimination onto Title VII.152 The science of sociolinguistics, 
however, validates this jump. If an employer can show that a male em-
ployee was discriminated against solely because he was thought to have 
sex with other men, and no possible feminine traits of the employee were 
a part of that discrimination, then the discrimination should be consid-
ered sexual orientation discrimination. If a reasonable person could be-
lieve that other, illegitimate discriminatory motives are present, then 
summary judgment is improper. 
Of course, creating a claim that pleads facts supporting sex discrim-
ination is essential to surviving summary judgment. Emphasizing the 
importance of framing pleadings, Olivia Szwalbnest argued that a cohe-
sive narrative can turn a sexual orientation claim into a gender claim.153 
While precise facts are necessary to demonstrate gender discrimination, 
including the gay accent as a form of gender discrimination does not de-
ceptively dress up an actual sexual orientation claim as gender bias. 
Pleadings should represent a meritorious claim, and sociolinguist find-
ings create merit in gay-accent cases. 
                                                        
 151. See supra text accompanying notes 90–103. 
 152. Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and 
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V. CONCLUSION 
When federal courts are confronted with employment discrimina-
tion claims involving harassment, retaliation, or disparate treatment 
based on the gay or effeminate sound of a male employee’s voice, courts 
should consider the likely ambiguity in this type of discrimination and 
preclude summary judgment for either party. Beyond phonetics research, 
more inquiries will be necessary to determine the gendered or 
nongendered nature of other stereotypically gay traits. In this light, the 
gay accent can be seen as a case study in pursuit of further research for 
similar civil rights purposes. 
This argument relies on a more modern and holistic understanding 
of sex and gender discrimination while still adhering to Title VII’s pur-
pose of deterring discrimination based on sex. This broader analysis may 
push many courts further than they have previously gone in protecting 
alleged victims of sex discrimination. Yet, enough courts have shown a 
willingness to take into account more modern theories of sex, gender, 
and sexuality to deepen the analysis of a gay male employee’s sex dis-
crimination claim, and preclude summary judgment for the employer.154 
Moreover, courts should submit ambiguous cases to a jury because 
community members, rather than judicial application of outdated social 
notions, can better determine the current cultural lines between gender, 
sex, and sexuality.  
While legislation may be the best tool to extend legal equality to all 
sexual orientations, the judiciary also has a role in creating a more just 
society.155 The American legal system has consistently allowed for flexi-
bility in interpreting the law as our social, scientific, and moral under-
standings progress.156 Correcting existing boundaries between sex, gen-
der, and sexuality should be no different. 
                                                        
 154. See, e.g., Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2009); Rene v. 
MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enterprises, 
Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Scott A. Moss, Reluctant Judicial Factfinding: 
When Minimalism and Judicial Modesty Go Too Far, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 549, 565 (2009) (ex-
plaining that the Supreme Court consistently overturns lower federal court rulings using an overly 
restrictive application of Title VII). 
 155. See Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 156 
(2011) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit held that gays and lesbians failed to demonstrate that they were politi-
cally powerless because ‘legislatures have addressed and continue to address the discrimination 
suffered by homosexuals on account of their sexual orientation through the passage of anti-
discrimination legislation. Thus, homosexuals are not without political power; they have the ability 
to attract the attention of lawmakers as evidenced by such legislation.’”). 
 156. A famous example is the Supreme Court’s reversal on the separate but equal doctrine. See 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954), supplemented, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 
